12 Export-Import Scams in India (2026)

How it works: A "consultancy" or call centre cold-calls or advertises to aspiring exporters, promising to arrange overseas buyers and handle all the registration and certification paperwork. They collect a small registration fee first, then larger follow-up payments for fabricated certifications, showing fake emails and order confirmations to keep the victim paying.

Report to: National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal (cybercrime.gov.in) or 1930, and your local Cyber Police Station.

How it works: A foreign "buyer" makes contact, often through a B2B directory or marketplace listing, negotiates a large order, then says the wire transfer cannot clear until the exporter uploads or pays for specific certifications such as ISO, CTPAT or an "international trust" certificate, usually from a specific agency the buyer names.

Report to: National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal (cybercrime.gov.in) or 1930.

How it works: A buyer, often contacted through online networking or a business directory, offers an unusually profitable deal and asks the exporter to pay an advance to a supplier or intermediary first, promising reimbursement from the sale proceeds. The money disappears once paid.

Report to: National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal (cybercrime.gov.in) or 1930, and your local Cyber Crime cell.

How it works: Attackers compromise or spoof an email account belonging to you or your trading partner, monitor ongoing correspondence to learn invoice formats and payment timing, then send a message, timed just before a real payment is due, saying the bank account has changed and providing new details.

Report to: Your bank's fraud desk immediately (ask for a SWIFT recall or payment trace), then cybercrime.gov.in or 1930.

How it works: A buyer presents a letter of credit, bank guarantee or Standby Letter of Credit (SBLC) that appears to carry valid SWIFT formatting (commonly referencing MT700, MT760 or MT799 message types) but is fabricated or was never actually issued by the named bank, sometimes dressed up with references to "blocked funds" or instrument "leasing" or "monetisation".

Report to: Your advising/negotiating bank, and cybercrime.gov.in for the fraud attempt.

How it works: A buyer pays more than the invoiced amount, often with a fabricated or soon-to-bounce payment instrument, then urgently asks the exporter to refund the difference to a different account, before the original payment is confirmed as cleared and final.

Report to: Your bank's fraud desk, then cybercrime.gov.in.

How it works: Genuine goods are loaded and shipped, but through collusion, forged documents or compromised shipping records, the cargo is redirected mid-voyage to a different buyer or port than the one in the original contract and shipping documents, leaving the original buyer or exporter unpaid or the goods unaccounted for.

Report to: Your shipping line's security/fraud desk, DRI (Directorate of Revenue Intelligence) for customs-linked diversion, and cybercrime.gov.in.

How it works: A freight forwarder or customs broker, often one found online with no prior relationship, collects advance payment for freight, insurance or customs charges and then becomes unreachable, with the shipment never booked or cleared as promised.

Report to: Your local police (cheating/fraud complaint), FIEO or the relevant trade body, and cybercrime.gov.in for the online component.

How it works: A fraud ring sets up shell "supplier" firms that issue invoices for goods never actually supplied. A genuine or complicit exporter claims input tax credit on these fake invoices, pays IGST on the export using that credit, and then claims a cash refund of the IGST, extracting real money from fake paper trails. Exporters who are merely used as a conduit, knowingly or not, can face GST investigation even where the underlying export itself was real.

Report to: GST intelligence (DGGI) through the GST portal's grievance redressal, and cybercrime.gov.in if it involves online solicitation.

How it works: An unofficial "inspection agency" or "lab" offers to issue pre-shipment inspection, quality or test certificates (phytosanitary, pesticide residue, aflatoxin and similar) quickly and cheaply, without actually testing the goods, leaving the exporter exposed when the real destination-market check finds a problem the fake certificate said did not exist.

Report to: The relevant commodity board or FSSAI, and cybercrime.gov.in if solicited online.

How it works: A buyer sends what looks like a SWIFT transfer copy, an MT103 message or a bank receipt as proof that payment has been sent, and pressures the exporter to ship immediately on the strength of that document, while the actual funds either never arrive or arrive much later, if at all.

Report to: Your bank's trade finance desk, then cybercrime.gov.in if the document was clearly fabricated.

How it works: A party offers an aspiring exporter the use of their IEC, GSTIN or an established company's shipping history for a fee, often framed as a shortcut around registration, or offers a "job" that actually involves lending your own IEC or bank account to someone else's shipments. Either direction exposes the IEC or GSTIN holder to liability for goods, values or parties they never actually dealt with.

Report to: DGFT for IEC misuse, your jurisdictional GST office, and cybercrime.gov.in.